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Abstract Whereas right-libertarians do not think that it is a requirement of justice
that we raise revenues for persons with disabilities, both left-libertarians and liberal
egalitarians think that there is such a requirement. An issue remains for the latter
two theorists—how ought we to raise this revenue? Liberal egalitarians typically
endorse either universal taxation or taxation of the wealthy. Left-libertarians, on the
other hand, cannot so easily appeal to the methods of universal taxation and taxation
of the wealthy, as they are illegitimately coercive. One such method left open to the
left-libertarian is one proposed by Michael Otsuka. He argues that both left-liber-
tarians and liberal egalitarians should find the method of taxation of the unjust to be
a reasonably strong way of raising revenue. In this paper, I point out problems with
Otsuka’s argument, as well as directly criticize the method of taxation of the unjust.
Keywords Alternative methods to universal taxation  Charity 
Left-libertarianism  Liberal egalitarianism  Michael Otsuka 
Persons with disabilities  Right-libertarianism  Taxation of the unjust 
Taxation of the wealthy  Universal taxation
Introduction
Persons with disabilities, living at least minimally worthwhile lives, require either
professional direct care (of varying degree and kind) or indirect services in the
form of financial support. Either way, these services cost money. Given that this
money doesn’t come from those who need it, we must ask—where ought this
money to come from? Another very general way of putting the issue is this—how
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are we to raise revenue for persons with disabilities? At one end of the spectrum,
there is the claim that it is only by charity, and not by taxation, that revenue is to
be raised. In other words, justice requires that no one pay taxes to provide revenue
for those with disabilities. At most, we can hope that enough people out there will
be moved by reasons of charity. At the other end of the spectrum, there is the
claim that justice requires that everyone pay taxes to provide revenue. We can go
even further on this spectrum by suggesting that it is society’s wealthiest, and only
society’s wealthiest, who are to be taxed. Although I lean toward this latter
position, I will stay neutral for the purposes of this paper concerning the issue of
whether all or just the wealthy are to pay taxes for raising revenue for persons
with disabilities.
This paper is devoted mainly to evaluating the proposal offered by the left-
libertarian philosopher Michael Otsuka. Otsuka’s proposal is that we tax society’s
unjust (those convicted of crimes) in raising revenue for those with disabilities
(Otsuka 2003). I start in this introductory section by laying-out Otsuka’s
argument. Sections ‘Considering P1’ and ‘Considering P2’ primarily concern the
premises of his argument. In these sections, I suggest that his arguments for these
premises assume cases/conditions which are dismissive of what I will call
‘the Divisive Question’. This is an important point, as the Divisive Question is
what is important in the debate about whether and how to provide for the
disabled. In section ‘A Liberal Egalitarian Rationale for Their Answer to the
Divisive Question’, I give a liberal egalitarian rationale supporting universal
taxation as the method for providing for the disabled. In section ‘A Liberal
Rationale Against Taxation of the Unjust’, I give a liberal rationale against
taxation of the unjust. Given the developments made in the paper, I point to a
certain dilemma facing Otsuka in his argument for taxation of the unjust. This
dilemma is articulated in section ‘The Otsuka Dilemma’, the final section of the
paper. I conclude this paper by explaining that the Otsuka Dilemma is one that
presents a challenge to any left-libertarian wanting to propose a method for
providing for the disabled, where such a method would be distinct from universal
taxation.
Let me start by noting that I will use ‘‘the disabled’’ as short-hand for ‘persons
with disabilities’ and that I will talk about ‘providing for the disabled’ as
another way of saying ‘raising revenue for the disabled’. With this out of the
way, let me discuss some of the various, general methods of providing for the
disabled. Otsuka considers four methods: (i) universal taxation—‘involuntary,
inescapable, and coercively enforced taxation of the able-bodied that ensures that
each of them makes a roughly equal sacrifice on behalf of the disabled’; (ii)
universal giving—‘voluntary contributions by each able-bodied individual, where
the contributions are identical to the amount they would have been taxed’ under
universal taxation; (iii) non-universal giving—‘voluntary contributions exclusively
from a very generous but relatively small portion of those who are able-bodied’;
(iv) taxation of the unjust—‘coercive taxation of only those amongst the
able-bodied who have been properly convicted of performing justifiably
criminalized acts that it was reasonable to expect them to avoid committing,
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and which they committed even though they knew that they would be subject to
such taxation for doing so’.1
As I mentioned, Otsuka proposes the method of taxation of the unjust. In making
his case, he appeals to both libertarians and liberal egalitarians. Otsuka writes:
I would like to propose that liberal egalitarians who endorse the welfare state
and libertarians who endorse the minimal state can find common ground in
support of an unfamiliar means of forcing able-bodied individuals to come to
the assistance of the disabled in order to provide for their basic needs. (Otsuka
2003, p. 43)
In this paper, I address only Otsuka’s appeal to liberal egalitarians. Otsuka’s
argument for this is as follows:
P1. Liberal egalitarians should regard the case for non-universal giving as at least
as strong as the case for universal taxation.
P2. Taxation of the unjust, while not as good as non-universal giving, shares many
of the most important virtues of non-universal giving.
Therefore, liberal egalitarians should regard the case for taxation of the unjust as
reasonably strong, even if not as strong as the case for universal taxation.2
Considering P1
There are two of Otsuka’s arguments for P1 that I will look at in this subsection. The
first is what I will call ‘the avoidance of coercion’ argument and the second will be
called ‘preference of a voluntary army over a conscripted one’ argument. The
avoidance of coercion argument involves the following thought experiment:
But suppose that liberal egalitarians were presented with the following choice
between universal taxation and non-universal giving. Suppose that one day
they awaken to the startling news that a minority of the population has
volunteered to give in a manner that fully provides for the disabled. Would
liberal egalitarians prefer universal taxation to such non-universal giving?
(Otsuka 2003, p. 44)
I think that at least some liberal egalitarians would prefer non-universal giving
over universal taxation in such a case. I must note, though, why not all liberal
egalitarians would prefer non-universal giving in such a case. Some liberal
egalitarians might emphasize the egalitarian nature of our political obligations—i.e.,
everyone is equally obliged in some way to pay taxes for the purposes of the
disabled. Others might recognize the following possibility.3 Take three groups and
call them ‘The Stingy Rich’, ‘The Generous Rich’, and ‘Modest Means.’ The Stingy
Rich do not donate any money at all to the plight of the disabled. The Generous
1 All of the preceding quotations, characterizing the four methods, are from Otsuka. See Otsuka (2003,
p. 43).
2 This argument is taken word-for-word from Otsuka. See Otsuka (2003, p. 43).
3 I would like to thank a reviewer from this journal for pointing something like this out to me.
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Rich, on the other hand, do. But once the donations are made, The Generous
Rich are no longer as rich as The Stingy Rich. Finally, The Modest Means also
contribute to the disabled, but they contribute even more per person than the
Generous Rich. Thus, we have a tale in which the rich get richer and the poor
get poorer.
But let’s suppose that such a scenario does not occur. I think that absent these
concerns, many liberal egalitarians would find non-universal giving preferable to
universal taxation. And the rationale that would support this preference is the idea
that as liberals, liberal egalitarians want to avoid unnecessary coercion. Liberal
egalitarians might find it unjust that people are coerced under a tax that is
unnecessary in light of the fact that contributions are sufficient for the cause of the
disabled. Let’s grant this point to Otsuka.
Let’s go back to the thought experiment that Otsuka uses to support P1. This is a
case in which non-universal giving is sufficient for providing for the disabled. But
Otsuka does not consider cases in which non-universal giving is not sufficient. It is
these cases that liberal egalitarians and libertarians disagree on. In other words, it is
the following question that liberal egalitarians and libertarians ‘must’ debate in
terms of providing for the disabled:
The Divisive Question: Is there some just method to raise revenue for the
disabled when charity (non-universal or universal giving) is not forthcoming,
and if so, what is it?
Liberal egalitarians answer ‘yes’ to this question, citing the fact that some form
of universal taxation is what is required by justice. Right-libertarians, on the other
hand, say ‘no.’ But what about left-libertarians? Otsuka’s proposal of taxing the
unjust might just be a just method, though, in the eyes of the left-libertarian. But
will this proposal seem just to the liberal egalitarian? The last section of this paper
focuses on this question. As for now, it is important to keep in mind that Otsuka
appeals to a case which ignores the Divisive Question.
Yet Otsuka does address, or recognize, the Divisive Question in setting up his
thesis concerning the disabled (namely, that taxation of the unjust is a just method).
Otsuka writes:
In this chapter I would like to address the question of what, if anything, is to be
done when it is possible to provide for the basic needs of some individuals
only through a distribution of resources which encroaches upon the robust-
libertarian rights of self-ownership of others. Let us suppose that a given
segment of the population are disabled in the following respect: through no
fault of theirs, they lack the ability to engage in productive labour. Suppose
that, in the absence of voluntary contributions, their basic needs for food,
clothing, shelter, and medicine will be met only if others who are able-bodied
are forced to engage in productive labor on their behalf. (Otsuka 2003, p. 42;
emphasis, and double-emphasis, mine)
So why does he then suppose that charity is sufficient in providing for the
disabled when the task at hand is to figure out what to do when charity is not
forthcoming? I cannot speculate about Otsuka’s motivations, but only point out that
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his doing so is a problem for supporting his thesis. The problem is that he proposes
taxation of the unjust as a solution to the Divisive Question, but then ignores (as will
be explained further) when he assumes cases in which non-universal giving is
sufficient for providing for the disabled.
The avoidance of coercion argument, with its supposition that charity is
forthcoming, then can only support the following claim:
P1*: When charity is forthcoming (i.e., when non-universal giving is
sufficient), liberal egalitarians should regard the case for non-universal giving
as at least as strong as the case for universal taxation.
P1* is a distinct claim from P1, and, in fact, it is a much weaker claim, one that
says nothing in relation to the Divisive Question.
But perhaps Otsuka’s second argument, or rationale, will support P1. His second
argument, the ‘preference of a voluntary army over a conscripted one’ argument,
goes something like this: Otsuka considers the fact that liberal egalitarians prefer a
voluntary army over a drafted one (Otsuka 2003, p. 45). This, then, seems to be a
case in which they prefer non-universal giving (volunteering for the army) at least as
much as, if not more than, universal taxation/coercion (being drafted into the army).
Given that this is a case in which non-universal giving is preferred by liberal
egalitarians over universal coercion, this gives the liberal egalitarian a reason to
prefer non-universal giving to universal taxation.
Otsuka writes that ‘Many believe, for example, that, so long as it is possible to
raise an army for the national defense through volunteers, the state should rely on
volunteers rather than conscript from the general population’ (Otsuka 2003, p. 45).
Once again, Otsuka is using a case in which non-universal giving (volunteering
for the army) is sufficient for meeting the prescribed objectives (namely, the
objectives of the war). Although Otsuka does mention ways in which a liberal
egalitarian would still prefer the draft over a sufficient volunteer basis, he
ultimately concludes that a liberal egalitarian would prefer the sufficient volunteer
basis. But, of course, many liberal egalitarians would. Otsuka has drawn the
correct conclusion. What does this conclusion support? It supports, once again,
P1*, and not necessarily P1.
What Otsuka needs to show, though, is that when a volunteer army is not
sufficient for the objectives of a war, the liberal egalitarian would prefer some other
method than a draft (universal conscription). But what other method would there
be? A liberal egalitarian, by default of there being no other method of raising an
army, would prefer universal conscription, if she thought that the objectives of the
war were worthy ones. Some liberal egalitarians, on the other hand, may find
universal conscription (i.e., a draft) questionable. But the grounds for this, I think,
would be that the objectives of the war are questionable. Or, a liberal egalitarian
might be against the idea of raising an army for any war, no matter what the
objective may be.
In summary on this point, Otsuka’s ‘voluntary army’ argument only adequately
supports P1*, and not P1. He assumes, once again, that non-universal giving is
sufficient. Under these conditions, a liberal egalitarian would, or should, find non-
universal giving to be at least as strong as universal taxation. Yet as I’ve reminded
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the reader, these conditions are such that an answer to the Divisive Question is not
given.4
Considering P2
In this section, I examine what I take to be Otsuka’s main argument for P2. Recall
that P2 says something to the effect that taxation of the unjust shares many of the
important virtues of non-universal giving. What is this virtuous feature, according to
Otsuka? It’s that with both methods, there is a sense in which the provider has made
a choice to provide. And any method relying on the free choice of providers is
certainly legitimate. Let me explain. Otsuka considers the fact that most of the
unjust will most likely be unwilling to forfeit their money, even though they will
nevertheless do so under ‘threat of imprisonment’ (Otsuka 2003, p. 48). This
unwillingness is unattractive, in so far as it indicates that the unjust have not chosen
to provide. But as Otsuka insists, there is a sense in which the unjust have chosen to
provide, since ‘one’s forced contribution is the consequence of an unforced choice
to do wrong’ (Otsuka 2003, p. 47). More importantly, we have to consider the fact
that the unjust person committed a crime ‘they knew would be subject to such
taxation for doing so’ (Otsuka 2003, p. 47). Hence, when a person chooses to
commit a crime in knowledge of what would happen if they got caught, they have
also chosen to be subject to being taxed for purposes of providing for the disabled.
Otsuka does not consider the fact that either non-universal (or charity) is
sufficient for providing for the disabled or it is not sufficient. This fact, I think,
requires that two different kinds of cases be discussed.
Case 1: Non-universal giving is sufficient for providing for the disabled.
Case 2: Non-universal giving is not sufficient for providing for the disabled.
Let’s assess P2 in light of Case 1. Here, we can of course ask whether taxation of
the unjust (although not as good as non-universal giving) shares many of the most
important virtues of non-universal giving. And more specifically, we could ask
whether taxation of the unjust shares the virtuous feature of provider-choice with
non-universal giving. I think that the answer to this question would be ‘yes.’ And so,
P2 would be true. But how much weight should we give to the fact that P2 is true?
That is, how much weight should we give to the fact that taxation of the unjust
shares the virtuous feature of provider-choice with non-universal giving, when it is
already the case that non-universal giving ‘gets the job done’? In answering this
question, let’s consider two different scenarios. In the first scenario, non-universal
giving has already occurred and it sufficiently provides for the disabled. In that case,
4 There is one further thing that should be said here. Although P1* and P1 are distinct claims, I should
point out that P1 can be interpreted really in one of two ways. P1 can be interpreted under the assumption
that non-universal giving is sufficient for providing for the disabled. In that case, its meaning would
collapse to P1*. Or P1 can be interpreted under the assumption that non-universal giving is not sufficient
for providing for the disabled. But if non-universal giving were not sufficient for providing for the
disabled, then how could P1 be true at all? That is, if non-universal giving is not sufficient in certain
cases, then how could it be preferred by anyone in those cases?
38 J. Dittmer
123
in order to implement taxation of the unjust, we would be giving back money to the
non-universal givers. This comes close to rejecting the choice of the non-universal
givers to give away their money. They would be choosing to give their money to
provide for the disabled, and we/government would then be choosing to reject their
choice by not using their money for providing for the disabled. In the second
scenario, non-universal giving hasn’t occurred, but were we not to implement
taxation of the unjust, it would occur and it would be sufficient. If this is the case
(or: if this were to be the case), then why prevent what would occur by what is
clearly done through the choices of individuals? Although one could view the
criminal actions of the unjust as resulting from choices, it is much clearer that the
choices of the non-universal givers are choices to provide for the disabled. As such,
why prevent a situation in which people are clearly making choices to provide for
the disabled and instead implement a system in which people’s choices (of breaking
the law) are not as clearly describable as choices to provide for the disabled?
Let’s now assess P2 in light of Case 2. This is a case (or is representative of
cases) in which non-universal giving is not sufficient to provide for the disabled.
As such, the kind of question we ask in this case is: Which is more preferable to
the liberal egalitarian—universal taxation or taxation of the unjust? Now, Otsuka
can then say that taxation of the unjust is preferable to universal taxation in virtue
of taxation of the unjust, and not universal taxation, sharing the virtuous feature of
provider choice with non-universal giving. Once again, P2 is supported in cases
like Case 2. But once again, we can also ask—How much weight should we give
to the fact of P2 being true, in Case 2? Here, it is not a choice between non-
universal giving and taxation of the unjust (like in Case 1), but instead a choice
between universal taxation of the unjust. In Case 1, I suggested that there are good
‘liberal’ reasons to support non-universal giving over taxation of the unjust. In
Case 2, I suggest that there are both ‘liberal’ and ‘egalitarian’ reasons supporting
universal taxation (I discuss these reasons in section ‘A Liberal Egalitarian
Rationale for Their Answer to the Divisive Question’). And because of the
problematic features surrounding taxation of the unjust (section ‘A Liberal
Rationale Against Taxation of the Unjust’), universal taxation is to be preferred
over taxation of the unjust.
A Liberal Egalitarian Rationale for Their Answer to the Divisive Question
In this section, I give a rationale for the liberal egalitarian answer to what I’ve called
‘The Divisive Question.’ In line with the previous section, in which I discussed
Otsuka’s P2, this rationale works to show that in cases in which non-universal
giving is not sufficient, universal taxation is a just method for providing for the
disabled. It will be in the next section that I also show that taxation of the unjust is
problematic in its own right according to liberal standards in general.
I think that the best place to start in developing (or: in some people’s eyes
‘rehashing’) a rationale for the liberal egalitarian’s specific ‘yes’ answer to The
Divisive Question is from Otsuka’s own words. He writes that when non-universal
giving is sufficient for providing for the disabled, then indeed ‘liberal egalitarians
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would place more weight on the avoidance of coercion than the realization of an
egalitarian distribution of the cost of providing for the disabled’ (Otsuka 2003,
p. 44). In other words, liberal egalitarians, as liberals, are concerned that members
of society not be coerced in certain ways. Furthermore, there may be certain reasons
stemming from the concern to avoid coercion that override reasons stemming from
egalitarian concerns.
Otsuka is right to point out that reasons to avoid coercion are recognized by
liberal egalitarians—that they play a role in deciding which policies are just. Let’s
even grant that (at least, some) liberal egalitarians would find universal taxation to
be grossly and illegitimately coercive when non-universal giving could do the job.
But liberal egalitarians need not find universal taxation to be illegitimate coercion
when non-universal giving doesn’t do the job. The fact that taxation is necessarily
coercive does not mean that it is always illegitimate, or unjust. According to the
liberal egalitarian, universal taxation is not something to avoid in cases in which
charity (e.g., non-universal giving) is not forthcoming. If the result of avoiding such
taxation was that the disabled were not provided for, then the liberal egalitarian
would take this to be a failure according to their main aims as liberal egalitarians.
One such egalitarian aim is to make sure that everyone is provided for, at least
according to some minimal standard. When persons with disabilities cannot provide
for themselves above this minimum standard, liberal egalitarians view this as a
situation in which others are to provide for them such that the minimum standard is
met.
But not only does the liberal egalitarian embrace coercive measures for the
purposes of realizing egalitarian aims, a liberal egalitarian also embraces coercive
measures to realize liberal aims. Liberal egalitarians may embrace coercive
measures when this is the only way to avoid even deeper forms of coercion, for
example, slavery. Let me explain. When coercion, in the form of taxation, is
necessary for preventing the presence of slavery within a society, it is something
that is not only permissible, but also required, according to liberal egalitarianism.
The intuitive idea is this: Obviously, the creation of a needless coercive state
apparatus is to be avoided, for a just society is one where its members have liberties,
and such apparatus stand in the way of these liberties. But when the absence of a
coercive state apparatus allows for some of the state’s citizens to not be able to
exercise their liberty, it is antithetical to principles of liberty to not have those same
coercive state apparatus in place.
There are various kinds of slavery, all of which are to be avoided. In
understanding the kinds, we should consider the distinction between formal self-
ownership and substantive self-ownership (Kymlicka 2000). You are a slave when
another legally owns you, just as if you were chattel, a piece of property, or any
other item of use; the kind of self-ownership that is denied to you is formal self-
ownership. But this is not the only kind of slavery. Following Will Kymlicka, we
can observe that one is a slave when ‘economic necessity may force her to agree to
terms which are just as adverse [as slavery in the formal sense]’ (Kymlicka 2000);
so although an individual may formally own herself, economic necessity may be
such that she has no substantive self-ownership. It is this latter kind of slavery that
liberal egalitarians are in particular sensitive to. As such, liberal egalitarians aim for
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principles of distributive justice which prevent this lack of substantive self-
ownership for individuals of a society.
It is important to point out that the prevention of substantive self-ownership is
really more a liberal aim than it is an egalitarian aim. A liberal, but not an
egalitarian, may not be concerned so much with making sure wealth is redistributed
to people who already have their basic necessities met, such that they do have
substantive self-ownership. A liberal egalitarian, on the other hand, will want to do
more. But the point is that we can isolate a distinctly liberal aim that one be free
from slavery—in the sense of lacking substantive self-ownership.
One might ask why everyone has at least an initial claim to substantive self-
ownership? The rationale explaining why this is the case admittedly must have
certain egalitarian components, or aims. As such, the rationale supporting the idea
that everyone has a claim to substantive self-ownership is egalitarian. Let’s now
recap the rationale before us. First, there is the liberal aim that possessing
substantive self-ownership is important, or valuable. Second, there is the egalitarian
aim that everyone possesses substantive self-ownership. Additionally, and third,
there is an egalitarian aim that everyone already possessing substantive self-
ownership be held responsible (in some reasonable egalitarian way) in making sure
that those who do not have it—or would not have it without help—do, in fact, have
it. The disabled are a group of people that, according to how we’ve defined them,
would lack substantive self-ownership without help. There are three reasons
mentioned above that support universal taxation for providing for them. In sum, the
rationale for the liberal egalitarian saying ‘yes’ to The Divisive Question, and
endorsing universal taxation, is summed up by the three reasons above, one of them
being liberal, and two of them being egalitarian.
A Liberal Rationale Against Taxation of the Unjust
In this section, I provide a kind of liberal rationale, one that is only partly
egalitarian, against taxation of the unjust as a just method for providing for the
disabled. This section is broken into three sub-sections, each of which provides
distinct reasons against taxation of the unjust. The entire set of reasons provide a
rationale in the spirit of liberal thinking about justice.
Similarity of Choice between Non-universal Givers and the Unjust
Recall that P2 stated that non-universal giving and the taxation of the unjust share
certain virtuous features, one of them being that there is a sense in which both the
non-universal giver and the unjust choose to do something that will provide for the
disabled. In this sub-section, I’m going to suggest that the unjust, in committing
their crimes, have not genuinely chosen to provide for the disabled. We can
motivate this by examining the choices of non-universal givers. Non-universal




1. ‘Guilty’: The giver is moved by reasons of guilt, in that she feels guilty for
having so much, while the disabled have so little. In order to alleviate this guilt,
she provides for the disabled.
2. ‘Supererogatory’: The giver believes that the morally supererogatory thing to
do is to help out those who are less fortunate than herself (whenever she can)—
which includes the disabled. She does not believe that she would feel guilty if
she did not help. Instead, she believes what she is doing is morally
supererogatory.
3. ‘Morally-required’: The giver believes that she is morally required to provide
for the disabled. She may or may not feel guilt in not fulfilling what she
believes is her moral obligation. But she does believe that this is a case in which
moral obligation differs from political obligation. She believes people should
only be coerced to do what is their political obligation, not their moral
obligation. Nevertheless, she gives in this case because she wants to fulfil her
moral obligation.
4. ‘Justice-required’: The giver believes that she has a political obligation to
provide for the disabled. Although others do not share her opinion, and although
the state does not recognize this as a political obligation, she provides for the
disabled because she believes it is her political obligation to do so. She thinks
that there is some moral obligation to give money, and because of this, there is a
political obligation on the part of all able-bodied persons to give money—i.e.,
pay taxes.
There are of course other reasons to characterize the choice of non-universal
givers. We could even imagine ‘Deceptive’, who provides for the disabled, so that
she can be viewed by others as a morally good person. But whatever character-
ization we give of a non-universal giver, the content of her choice refers in at least
some direct way to providing for the disabled. Even ‘Guilty’, who chooses so that
she alleviates her guilt, nevertheless chooses to provide for the disabled.
How do we characterize the choice of an unjust person, in committing her crime?
Perhaps something like this:
‘Unjust’: ‘Unjust’ performs some act A which is criminal. ‘Unjust’ chose to
perform criminal act A. ‘Unjust’ knew that if she were convicted of performing
criminal act A, then she would be required to provide for the disabled.
So should we say that although ‘Unjust’ was moved by some other reason than
providing for the disabled (just as ‘Guilty’ was moved by some other reason than
providing for the disabled), she nevertheless chose to provide for the disabled? No.
She did not choose to provide for the disabled. She merely chose to perform some
act, which she knew was criminal, and which she knew that if she were caught and
convicted, she would then be forced to provide for the disabled.5 So, although we
5 There is, though, one way in which we could say that ‘Unjust’ has genuinely chosen to provide for the
disabled. In choosing to perform criminal act A, ‘Unjust’ has been motivated to do so for two main
reasons: (i) whatever reason for performing criminal act A—e.g., getting money, and (ii) knowing that if
she got caught, at least she would be doing something which benefited the disabled. Thus, her choice is
something like this: ‘I choose to perform act A, and I choose to provide for the disabled, were I to get
caught doing act A.’
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can say that non-universal givers have chosen to provide for the disabled (even if the
reasons which moved them were not for the sake of providing for the disabled),
there is no real clear sense in which an unjust person has chosen to provide for the
disabled, since what they have instead chosen is to perform some criminal act.
What’s important to note here is that there are motives behind our choices, and
then there are our actual choices. There are various motives that we can ascribe to
the non-universal giver; the list above shows this possibility. But even independent
of motive of the unjust, there really is no way to think of their choice to commit a
crime as a choice to provide for the disabled. I take this last claim to be some sort of
conceptual truth.
Another Problem with Taxation of the Unjust
There is another problematic feature of suggesting that the unjust have chosen to
provide for the disabled (just as the non-universal giver has chosen). Note that
Otsuka’s suggestion is that the unjust’s prior knowledge of being taxed (at least
partly) justifies the tax. I suspect that the intuition behind Otsuka’s point here is
something like this: Look, a person who has acted unjustly knew beforehand that if
they were caught acting unjustly, they would be taxed. In acting on what they knew
would make them open to being taxed, they chose to be taxed. And so there is no
ground for complaint that they not be taxed.
But this intuition can render interesting results.6 Suppose that instead of the
unjust being taxed for raising revenue, it is the wealthy who are taxed. According to
this method of providing for the disabled, anyone making an annual income of, say,
more the $200,000 is taxed. So, instead of providing for the disabled via taxation of
the unjust, we do the providing via taxation of the wealthy. Notice that taxation of
the wealthy takes the same form as taxation of the unjust: It is not universal
taxation, not universal giving, and not non-universal giving, but instead non-
universal taxation. More importantly, it is a kind of taxation that is based in a choice
made by those who are taxed. In the case of the unjust, the tax is based in a choice of
doing wrong; in the case of the wealthy, the tax is based in a choice of making
money, specifically, more than $200,000 annually.
Libertarians would probably find this result unsettling, and hence would need to
point to a morally relevant difference between taxing the unjust and taxing the
wealthy. They may say that there is a moral difference between being unjust and
being wealthy. But as I’ve at least hinted to so far, this moral difference is not
relevant with respect to providing for the disabled. The libertarian might say ‘Look,
the wealthy have done nothing to make the disabled be in the condition that they are
in; they have not made them disabled, nor have they taken advantage of them.
6 The results which follow are probably counterintuitive to most, yet for me, they very much align with
my intuitions. Nevertheless, my intuitions are not the measure of the intuitions of others.
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Hence, it’s unfair to make them pay.’ My response is that the same holds true for the
unjust. The unjust have done nothing to make the disabled have their disabilities,
nor have they taken advantage of them.7 Therefore, just as the wealthy are not to be
taxed, so too are the unjust not to be taxed.
Liberal egalitarians, on the other hand, now have an argument for taxing the
wealthy. We must recognize that taxation of the wealthy—just like taxation of the
unjust—shares the same feature as non-universal giving, at least according to
Otsuka’s reasoning—namely, that those providing have chosen to provide. Hence,
to follow Otsuka’s reasoning, taxation of the wealthy should be just as preferable as
non-universal giving. But if both taxation of the wealthy and taxation of the unjust
are just as preferable as non-universal giving, then which should they choose? Being
liberal egalitarians, it seems that they might choose taxation of the wealthy, for it
closes the gap between the wealthy and the poor. Hence, the same argument
supporting Otsuka’s contention that liberal egalitarians should prefer taxation of the
unjust even more strongly supports the idea that liberal egalitarians should support
taxation of the wealthy.
Otsuka recognizes this possibility for liberal egalitarians. He writes:
They might argue that such a tax would share much of the voluntary nature of
taxation of the unjust, since it would make the coercion escapable because it is
conditional upon one’s having earned a high income. Those who do not want
to pay the tax can simply refrain from earning a high income. But what’s
wrong with this scheme it that it, unlike taxation of the unjust, penalizes those
who choose to do something that they are entitled to do—earn a lot of money.
(Otsuka 2003, p. 48, fn. 8)
Thus, Otsuka thinks there to be a relevant difference between the activities of the
wealthy and the activities of the unjust, which justifies taxation based on one
scheme but not on the other. It’s that people are entitled to make money, but they are
not entitled to commit criminal acts.
At this point, there are two responses that can be given to Otsuka’s reliance on
entitlement as a morally relevant difference between the two cases. Here’s the first
response: I certainly agree with him that people are not entitled to commit criminal
acts, and I think any liberal egalitarian would agree with him on this point. But
Otsuka has overlooked the fact that at least some liberal egalitarians would agree
with him only because they believe in something like an error-theory of
entitlements. That is, although we speak of being entitled to do such-and-such, it
is categorically false that we are entitled to anything. So, just as we are not entitled
7 If someone has acted unjustly to cause a disability or has taken advantage of someone with a disability,
then that is a separate matter. There is nothing within the concept of ‘acting unjustly’ which includes the
concept of ‘causing disability.’ Now, if someone causes a disability, then, of course, they must
compensate and perhaps be punished, as well. Additionally, anything that they acquired through their
injustice, they must give up. We could say that they are entitled to their gains. But Otsuka’s proposal is
that we tax/punish the unjust over and above such that they provide for those that they did no injustice to.
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to committing crimes, we are not entitled to make lots of money. We may have
rights, but we are not entitled to anything.8
As such, Otsuka must now change from the relevant difference of ‘entitlements’
to something like ‘rights.’ Whereas we have a right to make lots of money, we do
not have a right to commit crimes. Yet now Otsuka’s point loses force. Because
although we have a right to make lots of money, that does not mean that we are not
required to pay taxes on it. In the state of the liberal egalitarian, there are plenty of
things that we have a right to do, but that does not mean that we do not owe the state
taxes in doing those things. I have a right to travel our interstates, but that does not
mean that I am not required to pay some kind of tax for that right. I have a right to
make lots of money, but that does not mean that I am not required to pay taxes when
I’m successful in my rightful pursuit.
This first response nevertheless cannot be endorsed (or: put forward) by all
liberals (And what we are seeking is a liberal rationale against taxation of the
unjust.). Not all liberal egalitarians have to go down the route of denying
entitlements. As such, a response to Otsuka based on error-theory of entitlement will
not be adequately persuasive for all liberal egalitarians, and especially liberals
across the board. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that in endorsing
entitlements, one is not saying that there are no grounds which could cause one to
give up their entitlements. There is nothing about the concept of entitlement that
makes it conceptually incoherent to say that entitlements, under certain conditions,
may be justly taxed. Reasons of justice might support the justice of taxing from
people’s entitlements.
So, a second response to Otsuka does not deny the existence of entitlements.
Instead, it recognizes the fact that the wealthy are entitled to their money, bracketing
the question of whether it is just or not for them to be taxed. Let’s suppose that the
wealthy are taxed for a cause that has no basis in justice. For example, the wealthy
are taxed so that their taxes are used for providing public access to attend
symphonies and musicals. This would surely be an example of unjust taxing, and
hence of illegitimate takings of wealthy persons’ entitlements. Now, let’s suppose
that instead of taxing the wealthy, we tax the unjust for the purpose of providing
public access to attend symphonies and musicals. Wouldn’t this also be a case of
illegitimate taking of entitlements? Note that the unjust have already compensated,
and perhaps been punished, for what they took that was not theirs. Once
8 Recall the debate between Nozick, a paradigm libertarian, and Rawls, a paradigm liberal egalitarian,
over holdings and earnings based on our natural assets. According to Rawls, since we do not deserve our
natural assets, we do not deserve our holdings and earning which are based on them. Nozick counters by
saying that there is a difference between desert and entitlement. Although we may not deserve out natural
assets, we are entitled to them, and to our holdings and earnings based on them. I cannot settle this debate
here. I can only point to one possible idea. Nozick may be right to talk about our being entitled to our
natural assets, in that no one else has a right to use them without our consent. But even if he is right about
this, it might still be the case that we are not entitled to everything that we acquire by our using them.
That is, others may not use them without our consent, but if we use them to acquire goods, then we may
have to pay taxes on these goods. Note that my suggestion still allows for an error-theory of entitlement.
When we say that we are entitled to our natural assets, what we are referring to is not an entitlement, but
instead to a fact concerning rights; others do not have a right to use our natural assets, but they do have a
right to collect taxes on goods that we acquire by our using our natural assets. See (Rawls 1971, pp. 310–
315). And see (Nozick 1974, pp. 174–182, 224–231.
Raising Revenue 45
123
compensation, and perhaps punishment, has been done, anything left by the unjust is
what they are entitled to. And yet a tax to provide for symphonies would unjustly
take away the unjust’s entitlements.
I will suggest that in the above example of taxing some group for providing
public access to symphonies, there are two features that are important. First, the
‘cause’ that is cited for taxation is not an adequate basis for even a universal
taxation scheme. That is, it would be unjust to implement universal taxation for
providing public access to symphonies. Second, it was some particular group that
was singled-out to pay taxes, but without any adequate basis for doing so. Now, of
course, a liberal egalitarian might think that singling-out the wealthy is just, but
the kind of rationale I’m providing is liberal at its core, and not liberal egalitarian.
The fact that someone makes a lot of money is not a basis, according to the
liberal, for being taxed when no one else is taxed (The fact, though, of how much
money someone makes can be a basis for how much they are taxed). Additionally,
some egalitarians might not like singling out just one group on the grounds that
this would ignore the fact that everyone—not just a few—are obliged to pay taxes.
Now, given what has been said above, there is a strong liberal reason for not
taxing the unjust for providing for the disabled. Just as taxation of the wealthy is
unjust because they are singled out without basis, so too taxation of the unjust is
unjust because it would single them without basis, even if there is a basis which
supports universal taxation.
The final thing to say about the first and second responses to Otsuka’s objection is
as follows: Otsuka objects that there is a relevant difference between taxing the
unjust and taxing the wealthy which is based in the notion of entitlement. The first
response rejects entitlement, and thus rejects the entitlement-based way of
distinguishing the two forms of taxation. Thus, from the liberal egalitarian
perspective, there is a stronger rationale supporting taxing the wealthy over taxing
the unjust (as the gap in wealth would be closed a bit more by taxing the wealthy).
The second response maintains the concept of entitlement, yet upholds the idea of
taxing someone’s entitlements. But it points out two ways in which someone can be
unjustly taxed on their entitlements. Either they are taxed for some purpose that is
no basis at all—that is, it can’t support a universal taxation policy—or they are
taxed by being singled out, even if the basis of the tax would support a universal
taxation policy. Thus, according to this second response, the liberal egalitarian
proposal to tax the wealthy would be unjust (according to liberal standards). But so
too would taxing the unjust.
Justifying Punishment Versus Justifying the Nature of One’s Punishment
The suggestion that taxation of the unjust is a legitimate, or just, way of providing
for the disabled is confused on two levels. The confusion at one level has to do with
the distinction between the legitimacy of someone being punished and the
legitimacy of the nature of their punishment.
I will now explain this first level of confusion. Otsuka seems to think that
knowledge that one will be taxed, or punished, prior to performing some unjust act
justifies (or at least partly justifies) being taxed. Certainly it makes sense that in
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committing an unjust act, one should be penalized. But the question is whether the
knowledge of what the punishment will be justifies that particular punishment—i.e.,
whether the nature of the punishment is justified. I think it does not. To illustrate this
point, let’s look at two different arguments:
(A1) If A knows that she will be punished upon getting caught doing unjust action,
U, then A cannot complain that it’s unfair to be punished upon her having
done U.9
(A2) A knows that she will be punished upon getting caught doing unjust action,
U.
(A3) A cannot complain that it’s unfair that she be punished upon her having done
U.
(B1) If A knows that she will be punished in a P-way upon getting caught doing
unjust action U, then A cannot complain that it’s unfair to be punished in a P-
way upon A having done U.
(B2) A knows that she will be punished in a P-way upon getting caught doing
unjust action, U.
(B3) A cannot complain that it’s unfair that she be punished in a P-way upon her
having done U.
Whereas argument (A1)–(A3) is sound, (B1)–(B3) is merely valid, but not sound.
This is because (B1) is just plainly false. It’s one thing to say that one cannot
complain about being punished for doing something unjust if they knew they would
be punished for doing it (were they to get caught). It’s another thing to say that one
cannot complain about the kind and severity of their punishment. If I steal your car,
it may well be that I ought to be punished, and that I have no grounds for not being
punished at all; besides, I knew my act was unjust and hence punishable. It’s another
thing to say that I can’t complain if someone suggests that I ought to receive life-
imprisonment for my act of stealing; that’s just obviously too harsh. I can also
complain about the nature of my punishment even if I knew what its nature would
be prior to my unjust act. I can certainly complain about the nature of my
punishment even if someone were to say that I ought not to complain since I knew
what the punishment would be. This is because the injustice of my act not only
bases the fact that I ought to be punished, but it also bases the nature of what my
punishment ought to be. My knowledge of the nature of the punishment has nothing
to do with what the real nature ought to be. In general, Otsuka’s point comes
suspiciously close to: The truth-maker for the claim ‘The nature of X is N’ is the
fact that S knows that the nature of X is N. If this is Otsuka’s point, then we should
quickly disregard it.
I suspect a reply on Otsuka’s part. Otsuka thinks that strong rationales for strict
upper limits to punishment are lacking (Otsuka 2003, p. 51). If we reject the notion
of upper limits to punishment, we could more easily justify a claim like (B1). This is
9 Note that I mean ‘complain’ not in the sense of ‘being capable of complaining’ but instead ‘worthy of
complaining sense.’ That is, there some kind of moral basis to the complaint being made.
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because the usual grounds for complaint about how one is punished—i.e., the kind
and severity of punishment—have to do with proportionality to the wrongness/
injustice of the act. But if we reject upper limits, we can also reject complaints about
how a punishment is too severe. And if one knows that one can be justifiably
punished in a very severe way for performing some unjust act, then one also has
very good reason not to perform that act. Hence, if one were to perform that act, one
cannot complain about the severe punishment; if one did complain, then one could
be accused of being irrational, for ‘After all, you did know that you would be
justifiably punished in a severe way prior to your doing of your unjust act.’ All I can
really say is that a rejection of upper limits would render an infinite number of
counterintuitive results.10
What kinds of counterintuitive results would we get? Without upper limits of
punishment, we could get the result that one be executed for stealing a soda. But I
don’t that this would be a worry for Otsuka’s view. First of all, the kind of
punishment of the unjust could not be execution, as this would be a waste of slave
labor needed for providing for persons with disabilities. Additionally, there will be
some sort of upper limit to punishment—yet, an unfixed limit—according to
Otsuka’s view. The standard for punishment would be something like: Punishment
for compensation, perhaps deterrence, perhaps retribution, and perhaps rehabil-
itation plus whatever punishment to be extracted so that when summed up with
other criminals, the disabled will be provided for. Thus, as the cost of providing
for the disabled decreases and/or the number of criminals/unjust increases, the
amount of ‘extra’ punishment extracted from each criminal/unjust person
decreases. Theoretically, though, as the cost of providing for the disabled
increases and/or the number of criminals/unjust decreases, the amount of ‘extra’
punishment extracted from each criminal/unjust person increases. And thus, we
have an explanation for how someone caught stealing a soda could be sentenced
to a life of hard labor. This seems counterintuitive, and as such, is a reason to
reject Otsuka’s proposal. Additionally, it seems contrary to our ideas about justice
that the idea that the amount of ‘extra’ punishment fluctuates according to
arbitrary factors like the number of criminals and the cost of providing for the
disabled.
In sum, the confusion, at the first level, of suggesting taxation of the unjust is
that support for it does not recognize the distinction between justifying someone
being punished and justifying the nature of their punishment. The second level of
confusion should be more transparent. We must observe that Otsuka has conflated
punitive justice with distributive justice; he tells us to distribute a portion of
society’s goods to the disabled (a distributive concern) from the taxes paid out by
the unjust (a punitive idea). The distinction between punitive justice and
distributive justice is very important. First of all, we could imagine worlds in
which there was no need for punitive justice, and yet there was still a need for
10 Otsuka footnotes both Warren Quinn and Joel Feinberg for ideas relating to the topic of upper limits of
punishment. See Quinn (1985). See Feinberg (1965).
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distributive justice.11 There could be a world with no criminals, but plenty of
disabled persons. Secondly, in worlds like ours in which we have both, we might
not adequately address the concerns of one realm of justice by focusing too much
on the other realm. Perhaps we have better ideas concerning punitive justice, but
not very good ones concerning distributive justice, because the distinction between
the two is not well understood. Going with Otsuka’s suggestion of taxation of the
unjust seems like going in a counterproductive direction.
Admittedly, there is one kind of possible world in which taxation of the unjust
would be a legitimate method. This would be a world in which there were both
disabled persons and unjust persons. In this world, charity would not be
forthcoming, and universal taxation would not be sufficient. Even taxation of the
wealthy would not be sufficient. But because there were enough criminals, taxation
of the unjust would be sufficient, and would be the only sufficient method of
providing for the disabled. Perhaps in this world taxation of the unjust would be the
legitimate method; short of that, its legitimacy is questionable.12
The Otsuka Dilemma
In this final section, I articulate what I will call ‘the Otsuka Dilemma.’ In effect, this
section puts together the pieces that have so far made up this paper. Recall the
Divisive Question, and the fact that liberal egalitarians answer ‘yes’ to it, citing
universal taxation as the just method for providing for the disabled, while right-
libertarians say ‘no’ to it, and left-libertarians are hopeful for a ‘yes’ answer to, but
are in search of a just method distinct from universal taxation. Otsuka’s
recommendation is taxation of the unjust. The Otsuka Dilemma, if it is a genuine
dilemma, should be disheartening for left-libertarians, as it leaves them without a
just method for providing for the disabled. This will be explained in this section.
In sections ‘Considering P1’ and ‘Considering P2’, I discussed Otsuka’s
arguments for P1 and P2 of his argument. His arguments for P1 assumed cases in
which non-universal giving was sufficient, and as such the conclusions he got there
did not answer to the Divisive Question. The conclusion that he would need to give
a distinct answer from the liberal egalitarian to the Divisive Question would require
11 Rawls’ work can be seen as one of the classic works which distinguishes between distributive and
punitive justice. Furthermore, in reminding us of the distinction between the two, he discusses the
possibility of there being no need for punitive justice. For example, Rawls writes:
In a well-ordered society there would be no need for the penal law except insofar as the assurance
problem made it necessary. The question of criminal justice belongs for the most part to partial
compliance theory whereas the account of distributive shares belongs to strict compliance theory
and so to the consideration of the ideal scheme. To think of distributive and retributive justice as
converses of one another is completely misleading and suggests a moral basis of distributive shares
where none exists. (Rawls 1971, p. 315)
12 Actually, I’ve already mentioned another possible world in which taxation of the unjust would be
preferable. This is a world in which we must replace non-universal giving with some other method, even
though non-universal giving is sufficient. A replacement that required taxation would be illegitimately
coercive, and so to minimize illegitimate coercion, we (including liberal egalitarians) would choose
taxation of the unjust.
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arguments that assumed that non-universal giving is insufficient. As for P2, Otsuka
did not distinguish between Case 1 and Case 2. In Case 1, non-universal giving is
sufficient for providing for the disabled. But because this is the case, the fact that
non-universal giving and taxation of the unjust share the virtuous feature of
provider-choice is irrelevant. In Case 1, although the two methods share the same
virtuous feature, we should nevertheless stick with non-universal giving. In fact,
opting for taxation of the unjust when non-universal giving has either done the job
or will do the job disrespects, in a sense, the choices made by the non-universal
givers. In Case 2, non-universal giving is not sufficient. As such, a decision has to be
made between universal taxation and taxation of the unjust (or some other method,
other than non-universal giving). Sections ‘A Liberal Egalitarian Rationale for their
Answer to the Divisive Question’ and ‘A Liberal Rationale Against Taxation of the
Unjust’ provided rationales that supported universal taxation (when non-universal
giving is not sufficient) and rejected taxation of the unjust. The liberal egalitarian
rationale for universal taxation is, of course, not a conclusive argument for it. But
why would we expect conclusiveness from something that is meant more properly
to be a rationale? Similarly, the liberal rationale (with some egalitarian consider-
ations in the dialectic involved in developing the rationale) against taxation of the
unjust is also inconclusive. But why expect so much from a rationale?
Given this, we can construct a dilemma. First horn of the dilemma: If Otsuka
intends to argue for the claim that ‘liberal egalitarians should regard the case for
taxation of the unjust as reasonably strong, even if not as strong as the case for
universal taxation’, and intends to argue for this claim in cases in which non-
universal giving is insufficient, then given that his arguments supporting the
premises of his argument assume that non-universal giving is sufficient, and given
that there are rationales which suggest that universal taxation is a just method
according to liberal egalitarians and that taxation of the unjust is an unjust method
according to liberals in general, Otsuka must provide us with different and stronger
arguments for his premises, ones not relying on the assumption that non-universal
giving is sufficient.13 But such arguments are lacking thus far! Second horn of the
dilemma: If Otsuka intends to argue for the claim that when non-universal giving
(charity) is sufficient for providing for the disabled, then ‘liberal egalitarians should
regard the case for taxation of the unjust as reasonably strong, even if not as strong
as the case for universal taxation’, then even if his arguments for the premises that
would support this conclusion would be good ones (as they do assume that non-
universal giving is sufficient),14 the conclusion he reaches does not answer to the
Divisive Question. But an answer to the Divisive Question is what is desired in the
debate about whether and how to provide for the disabled when non-universal
giving is insufficient. In fact, the debate is framed in terms of the Divisive Question.
13 I apologize to the reader for the ‘Kantian length’ of this sentence. This, though, is the best way I could
describe the first horn of the dilemma.
14 Note importantly, though, that even if his arguments for his premises are good under the assumption
that non-universal giving is sufficient, Otsuka nevertheless must be able to counter some of the arguments
I presented against taxation of the unjust in its own right. For example, recall the odd implications of his
rejection of upper limits to punishment, and the fact that one’s punishment could vary based on arbitrary
factors like number of criminals and the cost of providing for the disabled.
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What does this mean for left-libertarians in general? It means that in offering a
method for providing for the disabled, a left-libertarian must argue for a method
whose arguments supporting it over other methods must assume conditions in which
charity (non-universal giving) in insufficient. A left-libertarian, to be convincing to
a liberal egalitarian, must counter the rationale already in place for universal
taxation. Also, the left-libertarian, to be convincing to both libertarians and liberal
egalitarians, must not run into the same pitfalls of taxation of the unjust in light of
the liberal aims/principles discussed in section ‘A Liberal Rationale Against
Taxation of the Unjust’. I’m skeptical, but open to the idea, as to whether this can be
done.
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